Love and pride are passions related to ideas of entities capable of well-being. In the case of love, those entities are people we are related to, whose characters, qualities or traits we admire; pride, by its turn, is a passion related to the self. In spite of that, Hume is explicit in stating that love is naturally attended by a desire for the goodness and happiness of the beloved being; but it does not make sense to say that we desire our own happiness and well-being because we are proud of ourselves. How can we explain this asymmetry? First, I will deal with the problem of the contrast between the unrelatedness of the emotion of pride and the desire of our own happiness and the relatedness of passion of love and the desire of happiness of the beloved person. After, I will link the conclusions reached with Hume's famous claim that we cannot be happy in solitude. Our own happiness depends not only on our own well-being and success, but also on the wellbeing and happiness of the people we love, and both of which are related to the well functioning of society in the long run.
AZEVEDO, M. A. We cannot be happy in solitude
passion of pride seriously, we must conclude that not all passions are, at least "immediately", active. There is at least one passion that is immediately "inactive": pride.
We have some plausible reasons for thinking that this conclusion is coherent with Hume's moral psychology. One is that pride has a different psychological function in the economy of mind compared with love. Being active, love pushes the agent to go further; it is a passion convergent to desire. Pride, on the other hand, is a non desire-convergent passion. Nonetheless, why does Hume not say that pride is always followed by a desire of our own happiness too, in analogy with what happens in the case of the passion of love? The answer that pride and humility are passions "completed in themselves" does not seem a good initial answer. After all, are not love and hatred, similarly to pride and humility, also "simple and uniform" impressions? Apart from that, why is one regularly followed by a desire and the other is not?
One possible response is that it is not the passion of pride that we feel towards ourselves that produces in us the desire for our own happiness. This desire plausibly needs to come before. Hume does not make this point literally, but it is certainly compatible with his views.
Anyway, the more direct response Hume gives for the contrast between love and pride is related to the alleged natural association between pride and the self; for it is the emotion of pride that produces in us the idea of self (T 2.1.5.6; SBN 287) 3 . It is the phenomenon of the double relation between ideas and impressions that, in the first place, explains the natural connection between pride and the self:
In a word, nature has bestowed a kind of attraction on certain impressions and ideas, by which one of them, upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative. If these two attractions or associations of impressions and ideas concur on the same object, they mutually assist each other, and the transition of the affections and of the imagination is made with the greatest ease and facility. (…) It is after this manner that the particular causes of pride and humility are determined. The quality which operates on the passion produces separately an impression resembling it; the subject to which the quality adheres is related to self, the object of the passion (T 2.1.5.11; SBN 289 ).
Here, we have an explanation for Hume's view that pride, in contrast to love, is associated not only with an ultimate idea, the self, but with an idea without any other attendants. In the first part of this paragraph, Hume asserts that when two ideas with their respective impressions are, in a pair, strongly associated in the mind, an effect naturally follows. If an idea produces an impression, related by its turn to some other impression connected to AZEVEDO, M. A. We cannot be happy in solitude another idea related to the first, this cluster of impressions and ideas becomes inseparable in the mind.
Pride, then, is always connected to the self. Nevertheless, in opposition to what occurs with the passion of love whose objects are acquaintable external beings, the self is not "some sensible being external to us" (T 2.2.1.2; SBN 329). The self is an idea whose cause is not something we see or feel as an external object. It is not, hence, something whose traits are, all of them, observable. We can observe the object, whose impressions cause in us a particular idea, and this, by its turn, being agreeable, causes in us the pleasurable feeling or passion that we call 'love'. However, the "mental qualities" of the object of pride are not, in contrast with the "bodily qualities", observable traits. The self, hence, as an idea connected to pride, is not related to a typical external experience, not in the same sense that love is connected to people or sensible entities. We must suppose, therefore, a different natural intimate connection between our mind and our own self (or the idea we form of it), an intimacy that we do not and cannot have with the objects of love.
To say that we have a kind of intimacy with our self can appear, at first sight, We can agree with Mackie's interpretation that the Humean self is not a Cartesian ego of which we have any awareness that can solve the problem of personal identity (1980, p.160) . The Humean self comprises "the qualities of our mind and body" (T 2.1.9.1; SBN 303). Nevertheless, other people are also identified by bundles of ideas and impressions successively connected and located in our memory; and esteem, admiration and love can be passions attached to them. We know that they are other persons (probably naturally); nevertheless, there is no "essential" difference in those bundles of perceptions related, respectively, to us and to others. All of them are of the same "matter", that is,
We cannot be happy in solitude perception. It is rather mysterious, if this would be the entire story, how could we discern "ourselves" from the "others".
The only response Hume actually gives to this problem is that, in one case, "mind and body qualities" are associated with the passions of pride and humility, and, in the other, what arise are love and hatred. The problem is that "self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference" (T 1.4.6.2; SBN 251-my italics). We do not have any intimacy with the self, in the sense of an intimacy with a uniform and identical impression of ourselves, but we do have a bundle of impressions and ideas, in other words, "qualities of mind and body", and we do relate them to the self. Yet this "self" is not "external" mind and body, that is, another person; it is we. I do not see how Hume can explain that capacity of discerning other persons from ourselves, except by pointing out that feeling pride is best explained by the hypothesis that we are naturally designed for discerning ourselves from others. It is an instinctive capacity:
I find that the peculiar object of pride and humility is determined by an original and natural instinct, and that it is absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions should ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious (T 2.1.5.3; SBN 285 ).
This is also a natural psychological fact. All of us develop by nature a peculiar passion (pride) which is very different from other passions, as love, and this is best explained by the hypothesis that we are naturally equipped with a basic capacity of discerning ourselves from the others 4 . The combined fact that pride is not attended with any further desires and that love is a passion "not completed in itself" amount to that.
A second explanation is that Hume explicitly avoided conflating the desire for our own happiness and self-love. Self-love and pride are very different notions. Actually, "self-love" is a misleading expression for Hume. Since love is always directed to "some sensible being external to us", we cannot talk properly of any kind of "self-love", for self is not any being "external". The same applies obviously to hate: "We may be mortified by our own faults and follies; but [we] never feel any anger or hatred, except from the injuries of others" (T 2.2.1.2; SBN 329).
For Hume, self-love theories are actually bad explanations. Consider, for example, Hume's comparison between his own theory and the self-love approach to the problem of our esteem for rich people:
It is obvious, that, though riches and authority undoubtedly give their owner a power of doing us service, yet this power is not to be considered as on the same footing with that which they afford him of pleasing himself, and satisfying his own appetites. Self-love approaches the power and exercise very near each other in the latter case; but in order to produce a similar effect in the former, we must suppose a friendship and good-will to be conjoined with the riches. Without that circumstance it is difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage from the riches of others, though there is nothing more certain than that we naturally esteem and respect the rich, even before we discover in them any such favourable disposition towards us (T 2.2.5.9; SBN 360).
It is not self-love, but sympathy towards the other the actual source of our esteem and admiration. Esteem or respect for rich people is, coherently, independent and prior to the desire of becoming proximate or favored by them; and our hope of taking advantage of their friendship presupposes this. In effect, if a person has a good disposition towards us it is likely that she can desire our own happiness. Hence, even if I am a self-interested person, if I think that someone else has a good disposition towards me, I can reasonably expect that she will desire also my well-being. Pride has nothing to do with that, at least until the personal attachment to the person we admire or love becomes accomplished in reality. In that moment, pride becomes real as a final sentiment, not as the motive of all the previous movements. Having "found instances", hence, "in which private interest was separated from public", and instances "in which it was even contrary", in spite of observing that "the moral sentiment to continue, notwithstanding this disjunction of interests", we must "renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love" (EPM 5.2.2; SBN 219).
However, a problem for the Humean view on the asymmetry between pride and happiness is that it is very plausible that pride can be a source of our own happiness. If I am proud (of myself), why cannot this sentiment plausibly produce in me a productive motivation for actions in the direction of my own happiness? If it is not "self-love" but sympathy that leads us towards a life with qualities capable of reinforcing our own pride, why do not accept that the emotion of pride could also reinforce the desire to have an The conclusion is not only that self-love does not constitute a noble reason for action; for pride simply is not a source reason for action at all. This is plainly captured by the following contrasts, that we desire the happiness of our friend because we love him or her, but we simply do not desire or own happiness because we are proud of ourselves.
The problem now is that we've got a plausible explanation of why we desire the happiness of the beloved persons (it is because we like them), but we do not yet have a good
"Humean" explanation 6 as to why we desire our own happiness (any more than the simple fact that we desire it). Could it be that the desire of our own happiness, in fact, is a passion that we develop by ways of some sophistication of the simplest passion we have for pleasure and the avoidance of pain? Why simply accept that, that is the way we are naturally constituted? After all, we are not naturally constituted to desire the happiness of other persons in any plausible account, for that desire is something we develop only when we become attached, by the sentiment of love, to another person. Hume's view is,
anyway, that we simply cannot avoid desiring our own happiness; but, in the case of another person, there is a condition: we only earnestly desire the happiness of someone else if we love, admire or like him or her in some special way 7 .
II
Hume's skeptical contributions on the issue of Happiness begins with the notion that there is nothing "valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed" in itself.
That is to say, there is nothing good or bad as such, but only something good or bad for AZEVEDO, M. A. We cannot be happy in solitude us, humans beings equipped by nature with some peculiar "sentiments and affections".
The positive view is that moral and aesthetical qualities pertain not to the object itself, but rest on our frame and constitution and our "internal" natural affections. This explains why we cannot describe the valuable and the beautiful only by describing the object's characteristics:
Desire this passionate lover to give you a character of his mistress: He will tell you, that he is at a loss for words to describe her charms (…). He will then say, that it is impossible for you to form a conception of such divine beauties as those which his charmer possesses (…). You can infer nothing, however, from all this discourse, but that the poor man is in love; and that the general appetite between the sexes, which nature has infused into all animals, is in him determined to a particular object by some qualities, which give him pleasure. The same divine creature, not only to a different animal, but also to a different man, appears a mere mortal being, and is beheld with the utmost indifference (ESY 1, E18.9; GG 216).
One conclusion is that the acquaintance with some object is naturally capable of exciting, without any inference, some peculiar sentiment in the mind. What I want to point out, at this juncture, is Hume's stressed view that to live in society involves not only the natural sentiments but also "artificial motivations".
Nevertheless, it seems, at least prima facie, that what people really need is only to live with some company:
Every pleasure languishes when enjoyed apart from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable. Whatever other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge, or lust, the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor would they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others. Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man; let the sun rise and set at his command; the sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him; he will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy (T 2.2.5.15; SBN 362).
However, if that would be the complete answer, why not simply seek the company of the people we love and trust, of our beloved relatives and friends, but outside the limits of society? If it were possible, would it not be the best alternative? The fact is that even those "natural" communities must be guided by some rules and artifices. Their people would develop at least some artificial virtues. Hence, when Hume says that happiness is only attainable in society, he could not be suggesting that what we need is merely companionship.
The desire to live in a political community is a passion that only springs up due to the intervenience of further ideas. In this sense, sociability is an "artificial" disposition.
Solitude is a miserable condition, but the problem is that the remedy is not immediately exciting, for it seems to involve the subjection to rules and authorities, with all the inconveniences of its constraints on our present interests and actions. It is a predicament since, to be happy, we need more than the mere companionship of the people we love;
we must live in a society governed by rules and even with people we do not like or are not personally attached to, within a broad community of strangers. Some conclusions are straightforward. First, the connection between love and the desire of other's happiness is a natural connection. We do not need to be helped by any artifice (rule or principle) to pass from the first to the other. Second, we are naturally designed to desire our own happiness (that is, we cannot but desire it; as remarked, we would be insane if we do not). Desiring both our own happiness and the happiness of the persons and beings we love is a consequence of our natural dispositions, a consequence of the frame and constitution we have as Humans. Society is, anyway, an artifice that secures, promotes and enhances them both.
Anyway, it is not necessary that we reach the last assertion by way of some chain of reasoning:
To reduce life to exact rule and method, is commonly a painful, oft a fruitless occupation: And is it not also a proof, that we overvalue the prize for which we contend? Even to reason so carefully concerning it, and to fix with accuracy its just idea, would be overvaluing it, were it not that, to some tempers, this occupation is one of the most amusing, in which life could possibly be employed (ESY 1, E 18.55; GG 231 In fact, Hume is thinking of a rather different situation than that of the coexistence of contrary desires, for the internal association between love and benevolence is plainly compatible with having ambivalent desires, since we can love and hate the same person, though not usually with the same intensity.
3 It is controversial, anyway, if Hume's view is that the internal perception of pride actually produces, that is, creates the self, putting hence its very idea into existence, or if the idea of the self is merely called upon by the idea of pride (being the self, then, presupposed). Terence Penelhum famously remarked on the apparent discrepancy between Hume's approaches to the idea of the self in Book I and both Books II and III of the Treatise (PENELHUM, 1992, pp. 281-292) . It is in Book 2 that Hume presents the "strange" claim that "the idea of the self is the product of the passion" (PENELHUM, 1992, p. 285 [Hume] does give in a way that makes it clear that although the idea of the self is 'produced' by pride in the sense that it is called up by it, it has in every instance to be an idea that we have and use already. It needs to be in our repertoire. There is no way in which the mechanism of pride and humility could be the origin of our consciousness of the distinction between ourselves and others; for it requires us already to have that consciousness" (p. 286). I agree with Penelhum, so I use "produce" in the sense of "called upon", as a mechanism of natural association, but as a mechanism that not merely calls upon another idea but also develops and enhances it. 12 The point, as I see it, actually concerns the role of reason in the case of the artificial virtues. Some people can be, for example, naturally prone to obey the authorities (hence, exhibiting natural loyalty). It is also probably true in the case of friendship and even in the case of justice. With respect to some differences in quality and degree, we can see the same kind of behavior in some animals. Fidelity (promises, authorities, friends, etc.), as a political virtue, though, implies something more than a mere proneness towards action, for in those cases we think in actions in conformity to known or presupposed rules. Being guided by rules and principles is the essence of the activity that exhibits the sort of virtue Hume called "artificial".
